# NSA Backdoor

I heard someone has been sneakily installing backdoors in open-source implementations of Diffie-Hellman... I wonder who it could be... ;)

This challenge was very difficult for me and took over 10 hours. This is likely the intended method. Scroll down for a much simpler approach.

The gen.py script is very similar to the script provided in the Very Smooth challenge. The largest difference is that

`c = pow(3, FLAG, n)`

is used instead of `c = pow(FLAG, e, n)`

(where `e = 3`

). Even though only one value was swapped, this is a substantial change that changes the encryption algorithm from RSA to Diffie-Hellman. So, instead of solving the discrete d-th root problem (RSA), we are solving the discrete logarithm problem (Diffie-Hellman). Here's a short explanation of the major difference between RSA and Diffie-Hellman.There is one hint for this challenge and it reads "Look for Mr. Wong's whitepaper... His work has helped so many cats!" Searching online for "Wong NSA Backdoor" finds this paper titled "How to Backdoor Diffie-Hellman" (Archive). Searching for "diffie-hellman David Wong" finds this article (this is David Wong's website), which links to this YouTube video of a talk by David Wong explaining his paper. The paper and talk both link to mimoo/Diffie-Hellman_Backdoor on GitHub, which is a repo containing the code for this backdoor exploit.

To solve this challenge, I read the paper multiple times, watched the presentation, and looked at a variety of miscellaneous resources on the internet. So, I suggest you also read the paper and watch the presentation to gain a deep understanding of this challenge.

The paper works up to an attack called "Composite Modulus with B-Smooth Order (CM-HSO)," which is what we will be using in this challenge. In order for the CM-HSO backdoor to be a NOBUS (Nobody-But-Us) backdoor, the composite modulus $n = pq$ must be large enough such that it is not susceptible to factoring with Pollard's p-1 algorithm (just like in RSA). To quote the paper, this method's "security also relies on the RSA’s assumption that factoring n is difficult if n is large enough." In the paper and code, "as a way of countering Pollard's p-1 we can add a large factor to both $p-1$ and $q-1$ that we will call $p_{big}$ and $q_{big}$ respectively." However, as we saw in Very Smooth, the public modulus is factorable with Pollard's p-1 algorithm since these large factors are not used and because smooth primes are used in the gen.py script. Thus, we can use the same script as in Very Smooth to factor $n$. Running the factor.py script with the given

`n`

produces the following values for `p`

and `q`

:p: ec4198b499d71ea60b224a4a9f0f04576fa8fd36485e05fd79a6ff1527be325a7a598341bbbedcd728b745525cc4b569f91a631ef74ee44f319e5f4d38bf3b9cb3d14b1a6e629553b831987695d0976a76a24860a23a7ebec42cbe41c625c8013e174ce1d19804e4b7111d8adab1a4690b5341c5897fcd33163077f07a4d0a17

q: e823cd272413ba5dbc8ade057120e2488345eea930e0b42f97d949c36e29218c2760059fef64d97da2a06144cb72e6451260d7e8f6d3cb78641131bdc2c8c09dc4f9395e0b1e9ac20d1266c9058b8c0e22ec7071236b1ab559188ed23de93213af1819453419f2108b453d3c9342e99a5a16e68acfe19b69af4b58b019a70047

Note that ZeroBone/PollardRsaCracker is another implementation of Pollard's p-1 that you can try, but I found RsaCtfTool's implementation, which I use in factor.py, to be better.

According to the paper, "Since $p-1$ and $q-1$ are both B-smooth, they are susceptible to be factored with the Pollard's p-1 factorization algorithm, a factorization algorithm that can find a factor $p$ of $n$ if $p-1$ is partially-smooth."

Next, we need to compute $x$ where $g^x\equiv c\pmod n$ (can also we written as $g^x\bmod n=c$ since $c<n$). We know all variables except $x$ and we know that $n=p*q$.

In the backdoor_generator folder of the GitHub repo there is a script to generate backdoored Diffie-Hellman parameters called

`backdoor_generator.sage`

and a script to test the attacks called `backdoor_generator_tests.sage`

. The testing script sounds the most interesting because it shows off the exploit versus the generator script shows how to set up the exploit.Note that before continuing you are going to want to have SageMath installed on your computer, which you can do by following their official installation guide.

The

`backdoor_generator.sage`

script discusses two methods of creating backdoored Diffie-Hellman values: Composite Modulus with Hidden Small Subgroup (CM-HSS) and CM-HSO, which I mentioned earlier. CM-HSS is what I thought was originally being used in this challenge since the paper states that it is no longer a Nobody-But-Us backdoor due to the work of Dorey et al. (Archive) and Coron et al's attack (Archive).As we can see in the

`backdoor_generator_tests.sage`

file (which I have saved to this directory) and section 4 of the paper, "two small subgroups" are used. These small subgroups exist because a generator g is chosen "such that both g modulo p and g modulo q generate 'small' subgroups." The existence of the subgroups allows "us to compute two discrete logarithms in two small subgroups instead of one discrete logarithm in one large group." The paper states "For example, we could pick $p$ and $q$ such that $p-1 = 2_{p_1p_2}$ and $q-1 = 2_{q_1q_2}$ with $p_1$ and $q_1$ two small prime factors and $p_2$, $q_2$ two large prime factors." Indeed, if we open backdoor_generator_tests.sage and look at the examples at the start of the `test_CM_HSS`

function we see a small factor for `p-1`

and another small factor for `q-1`

. We can confirm this by taking the bigger `p`

value and getting prime factors of `p-1`

in SageMath by running the below command:prime_factors(7323720966914812591055941708221331966484585723722438709794411811359163268313938691329827951251267050560591642529907351637378159060836729528663195017591659-1)

This outputs the following:

[2, 897696227, 4079175531008894722165264101205435926648149833274524116828226243263002635029421089083973587454582813212933133186660564875794091457642235099125127]

Thus, we can see that the graphic in the paper right below the previously quoted text accurately displays the situation.

`p-1`

and `q-1`

each factor into 2, a small prime, and a large prime. However, if we take our value for `p-1`

and get it's prime factors by running the following command:prime_factors(0xec4198b499d71ea60b224a4a9f0f04576fa8fd36485e05fd79a6ff1527be325a7a598341bbbedcd728b745525cc4b569f91a631ef74ee44f319e5f4d38bf3b9cb3d14b1a6e629553b831987695d0976a76a24860a23a7ebec42cbe41c625c8013e174ce1d19804e4b7111d8adab1a4690b5341c5897fcd33163077f07a4d0a17-1)

This produces a list of 67 different factors. Therefore, our values for the challenge cannot be broken using this method and we will need to use CM-HSO. Looking at the examples in the

`test_CM_HSO`

function in the test script, we see that a list of factors is provided, which is exactly what we have.Luckily for us, David Wong has written most of the SageMath code for us in the

`test_CM_HSO`

function in the test script. If you look at our solve.sage script, you'll notice that almost all of it is copied pasted from the `test_CM_HSO`

function. On lines 1-12 of our script, we define the values we were given and that we figured out so far, then we calculate `p-1`

and `q-1`

, and finally we compute the prime factors of `p-1`

and `q-1`

. Then, we simply apply the algorithm discussed in the paper and presentation to go through the many small subgroups and reconstruct the private key. At the end we print the private key solution and we compute $c=g^x\bmod n$ (where $x$ is the private key that we found). This is exactly how the $c$ value given to us was computed so if the values are the same then we have found a valid private key. Running the script with `sage solve.sage`

produces the following output:attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 32969

found it! 3138

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 33199

found it! 6803

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 33871

found it! 27378

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 34057

found it! 16222

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 34337

found it! 15166

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 34747

found it! 13210

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 35023

found it! 23279

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 35069

found it! 3463

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 35291

found it! 12728

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 36353

found it! 31678

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 36467

found it! 12587

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 36479

found it! 28933

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 36571

found it! 31442

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 36653

found it! 7804

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 36833

found it! 21713

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 37277

found it! 26965

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 38501

found it! 29378

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 38677

found it! 33985

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 39313

found it! 38773

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 39397

found it! 21112

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 39443

found it! 9720

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 39581

found it! 3449

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 41411

found it! 28647

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 41953

found it! 26225

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 42533

found it! 36616

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 43261

found it! 41105

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 43313

found it! 7467

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 43591

found it! 8617

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 43987

found it! 10465

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 44449

found it! 3691

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 44729

found it! 10888

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 44771

found it! 16800

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 46153

found it! 40391

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 46439

found it! 25479

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 47869

found it! 16057

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 47933

found it! 2027

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 48073

found it! 26661

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 48109

found it! 28805

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 48337

found it! 27143

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 48847

found it! 29834

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 50153

found it! 1554

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 50821

found it! 25844

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 51307

found it! 27336

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 53419

found it! 8474

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 53479

found it! 27939

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 53527

found it! 36332

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 53773

found it! 25027

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 55339

found it! 49784

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 55987

found it! 40592

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 56501

found it! 42478

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 57037

found it! 39119

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 58511

found it! 53382

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 58787

found it! 42045

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 59149

found it! 22613

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 59509

found it! 56896

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 59651

found it! 26731

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 60127

found it! 3969

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 60509

found it! 48595

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 60757

found it! 33035

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 60859

found it! 60326

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 61211

found it! 5171

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 61403

found it! 28853

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 61949

found it! 2563

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 62233

found it! 13222

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 63059

found it! 53457

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 65537

found it! 853

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 2

found it! 0

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 37463

found it! 32526

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 40841

found it! 37179

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 66301

found it! 56479

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 69761

found it! 15862

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 70271

found it! 21801

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 70709

found it! 57423

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 70793

found it! 57075

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 71011

found it! 27109

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 71119

found it! 24383

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 71837

found it! 41049

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 71999

found it! 26478

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 72577

found it! 22624

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 72613

found it! 56955

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 74017

found it! 43995

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 75079

found it! 64183

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 76481

found it! 74708

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 77471

found it! 61962

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 79181

found it! 13567

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 79687

found it! 31929

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 80737

found it! 28593

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 86239

found it! 6825

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 86257

found it! 21696

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 86453

found it! 10723

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 86627

found it! 85635

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 86923

found it! 15714

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 88721

found it! 65496

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 89917

found it! 69756

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 90499

found it! 66724

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 91957

found it! 80062

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 92143

found it! 40036

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 93479

found it! 1544

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 94201

found it! 82603

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 94723

found it! 62261

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 95911

found it! 32259

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 96097

found it! 35941

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 96731

found it! 5847

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 98963

found it! 61709

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 99923

found it! 26926

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 100279

found it! 2273

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 101267

found it! 62222

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 101429

found it! 30064

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 101573

found it! 39819

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 106031

found it! 4672

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 110069

found it! 65204

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 113749

found it! 20388

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 119027

found it! 59274

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 119869

found it! 59499

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 120193

found it! 49167

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 122599

found it! 23173

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 122819

found it! 6486

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 122827

found it! 85458

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 124277

found it! 46803

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 124739

found it! 106534

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 125863

found it! 72720

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 125921

found it! 112608

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 127703

found it! 37477

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 127763

found it! 87762

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 128747

found it! 29553

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 129169

found it! 116065

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 129527

found it! 90796

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 130639

found it! 74813

attempting pollard rho in subgroup of order 131009

found it! 51990

sol: 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

encrypted message: 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

The encrypted messages match so we have found the correct key. So, we have solved the discrete logarithm $c=g^x\bmod n$ for $x$. However, trying to decode this to ascii produces gibberish. This is because discrete logarithms can have multiple solutions. Essentially, it has something to do with group theory. The video explains quite nicely that $\phi(n)=(p-1)(q-1)$ (where $\phi(n)$ is the size of the group) if $n=pq$. According to the paper several properties of

`p`

and `q`

result "in a non-cyclic group with an upper-bound on possible subgroup orders of $lcm(s,t)=\frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{2}$." So, `gmpy2.lcm(p-1, q-1) == ((p-1)*(q-1))//2`

. Therefore, Carmichael totient's is $\lambda=\frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{2}$. The Carmichael function $\lambda(n)$ is the exponent/order of the multiplicative group of integers modulo n. (This page explains more about the Carmichael function. We don't use Euler's totient because the Carmichael function is more generalized.) Therefore, we can add or subtract $\frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{2}$ from the solution our SageMath script found (because we have a cyclical group) and then compute $c=g^x\bmod n$ with our modified solution and still get the original $c$ value.I'm still unsure about the math behind this. So, I messed around with the find_other_solutions.py script for a while and eventually found that subtracting $\frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{4}$ from the computed key worked successfully and got the flag.

This method is not explained since it should be somewhat understandable if you read through the above method.

First, use Pollard's p-1 algorithm to calculate

`p`

and `q`

. You can use the implementation in factor.py.Second, run simple_solve.sage, which will print the hexadecimal key,

`0x7069636f4354467b31636139333835387d`

, and the flag.Essentially, all of Mr. Wong's code (splitting the problem into multiple parts and then using the CRT) is unnecessary for this challenge and sagemath's

`discrete_log`

function is powerful enough.`picoCTF{1ca93858}`

Last modified 1yr ago